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ABSTRACT
Investments to protect against known vulnerabilities are necessary but not sufficient to assure a firm’s information security.
New threats are continuously being designed and deployed to exploit vulnerabilities that defending firms have not yet
discovered.  Extant literature has identified the advantages for firms to share information about vulnerabilities, attacks and
damages from breaches.  Yet firms are hesitant to share information.  I seek to understand that paradox.  First I explicate the
relationship between firm IT strategy and risk exposure.  Next I delineate between known and unknown threats to explain
organizational learning required to manage exposure.  Finally I propose a relationship between risk exposure and  security
information exchange.
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INTRODUCTION
Information security related crime is responsible for a significant amount of financial loss to companies conducting business
through the Internet (Gordon, Loeb, Lucyshyn and Richardson 2004). Attacks on corporate information assets motivated by
criminal, profit-oriented intent have been increasing in number and sophistication (Tabone 2005).  However, the full degree
of financial loss due to information security breaches is difficult to assess because the majority of firms are hesitant to report
breaches for fear of market reprisal (Campbell, Gordon, Loeb and Zhou 2003).
Firms have taken these threats seriously and have invested both technology and human resources to protect their information
assets (Conry-Murray 2003).  But, the pace of innovation by criminals to exploit firm network vulnerabilities has made it
difficult for any single firm to be able to protect their network alone.  Information security is a complex technology-based
ecosystem of attackers and defenders involved in a continuous learning process.  Tracing the evolution of the SOBIG virus
provides an example of this learning process.  Headlines published by CNET on NEWS.com January 13, 2003 claimed,
“Sobig virus sows few PC problems”. The article stated; "The worm also has the ability to retrieve updates of itself from the
Web. The latest update contains backdoor software that could allow an attacker to access the victim's PC."
The central message was that the Sobig virus was not anything to really worry about.  However the virus was displaying the
ability to update itself from the Web, an activity that was not understood.   Six months later, the June 3, headline stated,
“Sobig worm keeps on growing” The article quoted Vincent Gullotto, vice president of the antivirus emergency response
team at computer security company Network Associates as stating "The third variant of the Sobig worm really adds nothing
new”.
Again traditional sources did not see a problem.  Within weeks, researchers at MessageLabs had discovered the true nature of
the intent of the SOBIG virus.  Their analysis was the basis of the June 25th headline;
“Sobig spawns a recipe for secret spam”.   The article went on to state, "While there is no concrete proof that Sobig.E has
been created and released by a spammer … many bulk e-mailers are already using computers infected with a previous
variant of the computer virus to avoid leaving traces".
Armed with this new understanding of the virus, by August 20, the headline now declared,
“ISPs: Sobig's the biggest virus so far”.  The article quotes Mark Sunner, chief technology officer at MessageLabs as
remarking "This is the fastest (virus) that we have seen, The Sobig virus writer's use of an inbuilt expiry date indicates that he
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is committed to inventing new and improved versions.  Each variant released so far has exceeded the previous one in growth
and impact during the critical initial window of vulnerability."
A firm’s ability to defend their network against attack is greatly dependent upon their capability to sense and respond to
different types of attacks, some that are similar and others that are different from past threats.  The Sobig story supports the
argument that new threats are often interpreted based upon past experience and knowledge sources.  The SOBIG threat was
not considered dangerous by the traditional knowledge sources (virus protection software vendors) for more than 6 months.
Insight exposing the true threat of Sobig came from a new knowledge source.  In dynamic environments, a firm’s ability to
quickly sense and respond to unfamiliar events depends not only upon internal knowledge and expertise but also upon a
firm’s ability to learn from others (Cohen and Levinthal 1990).  Firms gain diverse information from sources with whom they
have weak ties (Burt 1992).  Firm absorptive capacity which results from investments made in organizational routines to
search for and access knowledge spillover (Gatignon and Xuereb 1997).  Extant economic information security investment
models do not explicitly address the development of firm absorptive capacity (Gordon and Loeb 2002a; Gordon, Loeb and
Lucyshyn 2003; Schechter 2004). This paper incorporates strategic, economic and organizational learning theories as a
foundation for future empirical research to explore the relationship between firm secrecy and information security against
external attack.
THEORY DEVELOPMENT
Firm strategy affects the role that information technology plays (Henderson and Venkatraman 1993).  At one extreme,
emerging technology drives the strategy of the firm (Huber 1990), at the other extreme, technology is merely a necessary tool
to support operations (Carr 2003).  A firm’s technological orientation (technological opportunism) drives investment to build
the capability of identifying, assimilating, transforming and exploiting emerging technology (Srinivasan, Lilien and
Rangaswamy 2002).  A firm’s technological opportunism determines the degree that they choose to capitalize on emerging
technologies such as the Internet.  Leveraging Internet technology does not come without risks, including exposure to
external attack.  Past literature does not explicate the relationship between firm IT strategy and risk exposure.
Risk Exposure
Information security is a form of risk management undertaken to reduce negative outcome of security breaches. (Gordon et
al. 2002a)’s economic model is characterized by three parameters of a firm’s expected loss due to information security
breaches: the probability of a threat occurring, the probability that a threat would be successful (likelihood of a breach), and
the loss resulting from a successful security breach.  The model fixes the probability of a threat since it makes the implicit
assumption that all threats have an equal probability of occurring and the explicit determination that the firm cannot influence
the  probability  of  the  occurrence  of  a  threat.   The  model  also  fixes  the  value  of  the  expected  loss  as  a  function  of  the
probability of a breach. This logic makes the implicit assumption that firms are concerned with an average loss, instead of an
extreme case.  (Schechter 2004) suggests that the probability of an attack is a function of four factors: the number of potential
attackers, potential profit, attackers’ perceived risk, and system resistance to attack.  Neither of these studies considers the
influence of a firm’s technological opportunism on perception of risk exposure.  (Straub and Welke 1998) identify industry
susceptibility to risk, past firm actions taken to secure information systems and personal awareness of security risk as drivers
for a manager’s perception of risk.  However, the study does not explicitly identify whether a firm’s strategy influenced by
technological opportunism has influence on the perception of security risk.  This provides the foundation for the first
proposition:
P1: A firm’s level of technological opportunism influences perception of risk exposure to security breaches
Organizational Learning
Firms are influenced by experience gained from internal as well as external sources as they develop their strategy for
protecting their information systems.  A firm must know something about information security in order to be in a position to
learn from others (Dreyfus and Iyer 2005).  Firms invest in relationships to gain access to more diverse sources of
information (Burt 1992).  (Cohen et al. 1990) investigated how firm investment in R&D serves not only to take advantage of
internal creativity, but also serves to enhance the firm’s capability for understanding external sources of innovation.  To
succeed in ecosystems driven by technology innovation, a firm, must develop absorptive capacity that enables quick assess
and incorporation of emerging unproven technology capabilities (Govindarajan and Kopalle 2003).  (Gordon et al. 2003)’s
model identifies the economic value for sharing information between defending firms.  However, the model has several
flaws; first it does not address the need to build absorptive capacity.  Second, it uses the average damage or loss that may
result from a security breach, when a firm may be more concerned with protecting against the extreme.  But most
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importantly, it does not recognize what may influence the perceived value that firm i would extract from sharing information
with firm j.
I propose that firms invest in information sharing dependant upon what they expect to gain from those investments.  Seeking
and sharing security information has considerable costs not only in terms of human and technical resources but also in terms
of perceived risk of sharing information that can be used against the firm by attackers.  Decisions to share information with
another firm must balance investment with perceived benefits.  Exhibit 1 graphically depicts scenarios of possible benefits of
sharing information between two firms.
Exhibit 1 –Information Sharing Venn Diagrams
Type A Type B
Type D
Firm i Firm i
Firm i Firm j
Firm jFirm j
Type C
Firm i Firm j
The inner circles represent the security threats for which there is a known solution, the outer circles represent security threats
that are known but for which the solution is undiscovered and the blank space inside the box represents undiscovered threats.
A perfect incentive exists to invest in a type A relationship because each firm possesses knowledge that is valuable to the
other firm.  Investment in type B relationship would provide no value to either party, since neither would gain additional
knowledge.  A relationship of type C would only benefit firm j.  Finally in a type D relationship, each firm gains a marginal
benefit.    This leads to the second proposition:
P2: A firm will invest in information sharing if there is a perceived benefit.
Information Security Investment Economic Models
Firms recognize that failure to carefully weigh action to address information security is important, since the market responds
unfavorably to firms that spend either too much or too little to secure their information assets (Campbell et al. 2003). The
prevailing wisdom is that investments in information security have been shown to have a diminishing return, (Gordon et al.
2002a).  However, the problem is complex: “Normal tools utilized to evaluate investments such as ROI or IRR may not be
appropriate” (Gordon and Loeb 2002b).
Investment to protect against known threats is necessary but not sufficient to guarantee security. The security environment is
characterized by uncertainty.  Firm investment can be categorized along a continuum of firm activism.  At one end firms seek
to  transfer  the  risk  through  insurance  or  outsourcing  contracts  (Brealey,  Myers  and  Allen  2005).   At  eh  other  end  of  the
spectrum firms invest proactively in dynamic capabilities as a strategy to provide flexibility to address environmental
uncertainty.  (Kogut and Kulatilaka 2001) identify real options or lobbying as forms of proactive investments.    I define the
degree that a firm invests proactively in a capability to address security uncertainty as security activism.  This logic leads to
the last proposition:
P3: Firm perception of risk exposure will affect the degree of firm security activism.
FUTURE RESEARCH
(Straub  et  al.  1998)  found  that  firms  were  hampered  by  the  lack  of  information  that  was  available  to  them  to  address
information security, yet they stopped short of investigating the propositions identified in this paper.  I will plan to follow
(Straub et al. 1998) by conducting action research of several firms extending their instruments to incorporate variables that
address the propositions discussed in this paper.  I will utilize this qualitative research to develop a survey instrument to
gather data from an information security user group of over 600 individuals representing over 400 firms.  Survey data will be
correlated with archival longitudinal data indicating the extent that firm revenue is directly derived from customers utilizing
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the Internet.  I will utilize a process theory approach to develop rich interpretations of longitudinal data (Miles and Huberman
1994).  Coding schemes will follow those developed by (Faraj, Kwon and Watts 2004).
CONCLUSION
I extend current information security literature in several ways.  First I explicate the relationship between firm IT strategy and
risk exposure.  Next I delineate between known and unknown threats to explain organizational learning required to manage
exposure.  Finally I propose drivers of IT security information exchange.
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